Bergson and Modern Physics A Re-Interpretation and Re-Evalua
Bergson and Modern Physics A <strong>Restrong>-Interp<strong>restrong>tation and <strong>Restrong>-Evaluation M. Capek Kluwe All the city in 1 notebook with - summary chart of the followed city by a series of charts divided by... Brilliant exposition of Bergson, and a critical analysis of metaphysical p<strong>restrong>sumptions. Capek divides his book into th<strong>restrong>e parts. The first part amounts to a particular characterization of the metaphysics underlying nineteenth century science and philosophy. This metaphysics is then undermined through consideration of Bergson's `biological epistemology'. The second part is an attempt to expound Bergson's theory of `duration', which <strong>restrong>mains obscu<strong>restrong> despite Capek's exposition. The third part <strong>restrong>lates aspects of Bergson's theories to certain featu<strong>restrong>s of <strong>restrong>lativity theory and quantum mechanics, the intention being to suggest that Bergson's overall perspective is a better match for contemporary physics than the traditional, mo<strong>restrong> static, perspectives. Overall the book succeeds in p<strong>restrong>senting and then criticizing a set of p<strong>restrong>sumptions in traditional metaphysics, and it does so by approaching and illuminating these p<strong>restrong>sumptions from a number of angles. As an explication of Bergson's own thought it is also very clear, but Bergson's theories do not necessarily become mo<strong>restrong> imp<strong>restrong>ssive through being <strong>restrong>nde<strong>restrong>d with clarity - conceptually they <strong>restrong>main <strong>restrong>condite. Lastly, an exposition of developments in twentieth century physics is offe<strong>restrong>d, and this again benefits from Capek's wonderfully clear style, and the philosophical implications a<strong>restrong> extensively discussed (Capek's p<strong>restrong>vious book, `The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics', is even mo<strong>restrong> thorough on this point). Google's online book site has several chapters available, cost f<strong>restrong>e. In Part One Capek p<strong>restrong>sents a characterization of a metaphysical position that might be termed `mechanistic determinism'. Wh<strong>ilestrong> primarily arising from the developments in physics from Newton onwards, Capek also traces its origins to the speculations of the ancient G<strong>restrong>eks. It is a world view which sees the cosmos as a machine, whe<strong>restrong> every action is fully determined by p<strong>restrong>ceding actions, and which thinks it cohe<strong>restrong>nt to consider the cosmos from a vantage outside of time, whe<strong>restrong>by the past, the p<strong>restrong>sent, and the futu<strong>restrong>, a<strong>restrong> all equally <strong>restrong>al and all equally determined; it is a view which sees the unchanging as the paradigm of what needs no further explanation, and which is conside<strong>restrong>d `most <strong>restrong>al' - in contrast, that which changes is `less <strong>restrong>al', even illusory, and, consequently, must be explained in terms of that which is changeless. On this world view, knowledge, and truth, a<strong>restrong> thought of as absolutes, unchanging absolutes, and they a<strong>restrong> to be found when this vantage surveying the enti<strong>restrong>ty of the cosmos, past, p<strong>restrong>sent and futu<strong>restrong>, is attained or approached. Wh<strong>ilestrong> Newton's laws of motion, and subsequent theories widening the applicability of mechanistic ideas, meant that this world view could be justified in terms of the determinable motion of solid bodies, Capek shows that a p<strong>restrong>d<strong>ilestrong>ction for such a view existed in ancient G<strong>restrong>ek thought and, derivatively, in Judeo-Christian theology. Given that the ideal vantage is one whe<strong>restrong> the cosmos appears fixed and finished, whe<strong>restrong> all change can be p<strong>restrong>dicted, the means by which one approaches knowledge and truth might also be expected to be fixed and finished, and not open to change through time, or `evolution' - these `means' a<strong>restrong> our systems of logic and mathematics - thus Capek takes `mechanistic determinism' and, indeed, most positions in traditional metaphysics, as asserting that the fundamentals of logic and mathematics a<strong>restrong> invariant over time and, mo<strong>restrong> strongly, a<strong>restrong> invariant in any conceivable world. In keeping with the p<strong>restrong>d<strong>ilestrong>ction for the unchanging and uniform, in theories which postulate fundamental particles, these particles a<strong>restrong> conceived as homogenous and eternal - this was the case in Democritean atomism, and so too with atomism's <strong>restrong>vival in the <strong>Restrong>naissance the appa<strong>restrong>nt change of the e